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GRIEVANCE MEDIATION: A STEP TOWARDS

PEACE IN THE BITUMINOUS COAL INDUSTRY*
STEPHEN

B.

GOLDBERG**

Turbulent labor relations, including frequent wildcat strikes, have long
characterized the unionized sector of the bituminous coal industry. In the period from 1971 through 1974, there were nearly 5,000 wildcat strikes, an average of more than 1,500 per year. In an effort to reduce the frequency of these
strikes, the negotiators of the 1974 Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement sought
to improve the grievance arbitration procedure, hoping that if arbitration could
be made more attractive to the miners, they would turn to it, rather than to
the wildcat strike, as a means of resolving their disputes with management.
One improvement made by the 1974 Agreement was to replace the existing
procedure under which the arbitrator decided grievances on the basis of a transcript and briefs, without ever seeing the disputants, with a procedure for
"live" hearings conducted by the arbitrator at the mine site. This change was
premised on the belief that if the miners participated more directly in the arbitration process, they would have more confidence in it. The negotiators of the
1974 Agreement also took steps to speed up the grievance procedure, believing
that this, too, would encourage resort to that procedure, rather than to wildcat
strikes.
These changes met with mixed success. On the one hand, as the negotiators had hoped, the frequency with which the miners resorted to arbitration
increased substantially. On the other hand, the hoped-for reduction in the frequency of wildcat strikes did not occur. To the contrary, the number of wildcat
strikes in the 1974-1977 period rose to 3,000 per year, twice what it had been in
the preceding three-year period.
In an effort to determine why the increased resort to arbitration had not
led to a corresponding decrease in the frequency of wildcat strikes, Professor
Jeanne Brett and I conducted a 1977 study of strike patterns at over 300
mines, four of which, all located here in West Virginia, were singled out for indepth research, including personal interviews with miners, union representatives and mine management. We concluded that the increased use of arbitration was not discouraging resort to strikes for two reasons. First, even with the
procedural changes introduced by the 1974 Agreement, the time required to
resolve a grievance through arbitration was averaging approximately six
months, which was perceived by the miners as far too slow. Second, the results
of arbitration were viewed by the miners as frequently both unfair and irrelevant to the problem that had triggered the grievance.
The miners' sense of unfairness rested primarily on the fact that more
* A lecture delivered at West Virginia University College of Law on February 14, 1983, as the
First Annual Russell C. Dunbar Labor Law Lecture.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois; LL.B. Harvard
Law School, 1959; A.B. Harvard College, 1954.
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than two-thirds of the arbitrators' decisions were in favor of management,
fewer than one-third in favor of the miners. The sense that the arbitration
decision was often irrelevant to the problem that had led to arbitration rested
upon the fact that that decision was nearly always predicated solely on the
terms of the contract, rather than on whether the employer's action had been
fair or reasonable in light of the legitimate concerns of the grieving employee.
Indeed, evidence going to the issues of fairness or reasonableness was often
held inadmissible at the arbitration hearing on the ground that the sole question before the arbitrator was one of contract interpretation. Because many of
the miners' grievances were not, on analysis, predicated on an alleged contract
violation, but on a more generalized claim that they had been treated unfairly
or unreasonably, many of them tended to view arbitration as frequently irrelevant to their needs. They were willing to resort to that procedure because it
was easily available, but were not willing to give up the wildcat strike, which
was more responsive to their needs. Not only was the strike faster than arbitration, it also forced the employer to deal directly with the issue that had provoked the strike, regardless of whether or not that issue was contractual in
nature.
Our sense that the failure of the arbitration procedure to deal with the
problems underlying the alleged contractual violation was an important factor
in encouraging resort to the wildcat strike was strengthened by our findings as
to the way in which grievances were handled at the four mines we studied in
depth. At two of those mines, where strikes were frequent, grievances were
dealt with by management strictly according to the contract, in both procedural and substantive terms. Grievance meetings were held at the contractually
designated times, and no others; grievances that had contractual merit were
granted, those that did not were denied. At the two mines where strikes were
less frequent, a different approach prevailed. In addition to the contractually
required grievance meetings, additional meetings were held in an effort to resolve the grievance. Furthermore, even if the grievance had no contractual
merit, management made an effort to resolve it in a manner that was satisfactory to the grieving miner if that could be done without interfering with the
operation of the mine, or in any other way compromising management's legitimate interests. In short, we concluded that management and the union at the
low-strike mines had a problem-solving, rather than a strict contractual, approach to dispute resolution. Stated otherwise, grievances were dealt with as
problems to be solved, not as cases to be won or lost solely on their contractual
merit.
Based upon this conclusion, one means by which to reduce the frequency
of wildcat strikes would be to train both union and management representatives in the use of a problem-solving approach. Indeed, we did precisely that at
a mine in eastern Kentucky, with substantial success in terms of strike reduction. It soon became apparent, however, that the cost of satisfactory training
was enormous, and the supply of individuals with the skills necessary to conduct such training was limited.
Accordingly, we next set out to devise a dispute resolution procedure that
could provide some training in a problem-solving approach to grievances with-
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out the substantial expenditure of scarce resources that is necessary for mineby-mine training. The result of that effort was the grievance mediation procedure, which I shall describe to you today. One goal of this procedure is to resolve grievances promptly, inexpensively, and in a fashion that deals with all
the issues, those that are noncontractual as well as those that are contractbased. Another goal, as I have already suggested, is to provide the participants
with experience in a problem-solvng approach to dispute resolution.
The essence of the grievance mediation procedure is as follows: After the
final step of the internal grievance procedure, the parties have the option of
going to mediation, rather than directly to arbitration. This option can be triggered by one party, or by mutual consent, as the parties prefer. In either event,
the mediation procedure is wholly informal in nature. The relevant facts are
elicited in a narrative fashion, rather than through examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The rules of evidence do not apply, and no record of
the proceedings is made. The parties are not limited in their presentation to
those matters that are contractually relevant, but are free to raise any fact or
argument that they think relevant to settling the grievance.
The primary effort of the mediator is to assist the parties to settle the
grievance in a mutually satisfactory fashion. In doing so, he encourages the
parties to focus not only on the contract, but also to consider issues of fairness
and reasonableness. This is done from the perspective of both the miners and
the employer. For, just as the miners frequently complain that arbitration does
not take adequate account of their legitimate interests, so, too employers complain that it does not take account of their legitimate interests in operating a
profitable enterprise. The mediation process, which is not limited to issues of
contract interpretation and application, permits the parties, assisted by the
mediator, to consider all legitimate interests of both the employer and the miners in arriving at a mutually acceptable settlement.
If no settlement is possible, and the parties appear headed for arbitration,
the mediator provides them with his opinion as to the likely outcome if they do
arbitrate. This opinion is not based at all on notions of fairness or equity, but
solely on the collective bargaining contract, as that is all the arbitrator will
consider if the grievance does go to arbitration. The mediator's opinion is not
final and binding, but is advisory in nature. It is delivered orally, and is accompanied by a statement of the reasons for the mediator's opinion. The advisory
opinion can be used as the basis for further settlement discussions, for withdrawal or for granting of the grievance. If the grievance is neither settled, withdrawn nor granted, the parties are free to arbitrate. If they do, the mediator
cannot serve as arbitrator, and nothing said or done by the parties or the mediator during mediation can be used against a party at arbitration.
In theory, this mediation procedure should meet the needs of the coal industry substantially more satisfactorily than does arbitration. Because there is
no written decision, it should be both faster and less expensive than arbitration, in which waiting for the arbitrator to write his decision, and paying him
to do so, adds substantially to both cost and delay. The absence of formalities,
and the freedom of the parties to discuss anything that they think is relevant,
whether contractually based or not, should make it possible for them to deal
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with the problems underlying the grievance, as well as its contractual merit.
This, in turn, should lead to both greater satisfaction with the process, and to
more satisfactory outcomes than arbitration. Finally, arbitration remains available as a forum of last resort for those grievances that cannot be mediated to a
mutually acceptable conclusion.
The mediation procedure, in which the mediator seeks initially to deal
with the dispute as a problem to be resolved, rather than as a grievance to be
sustained or denied on its contractual merit, should also provide the parties
with experience in the problem-solving approach to grievance resolution. If,
over time, they can learn from that experience, and utilize a problem-solving
approach in their day-to-day interactions, they should ultimately be able to
resolve a higher proportion of disputes themselves, without resort to any
outside agency, be it mediation, arbitration, or the strike weapon.
The central risks of this process are two-fold: (1) Mediation will lead to
few, if any settlements. This will increase, rather than decrease, the time and
cost of dispute resolution. (2) The availability of mediation will diminish the
pressure to settle in the internal grievance procedure, as either party may view
resort to mediation, particularly if it is fast and inexpensive, as more attractive
than accepting the other party's final offer. If the internal settlement rate goes
down substantially, the overall cost of dispute resolution will go up.
In an effort to determine whether mediation could successfully resolve
grievances faster, less expensively, and more satisfactorily than arbitration, we
conducted a series of experiments with mediation in the bituminous coal mining industry. These experiments took place over two six-month periods in four
states (Illinois, Indiana, Virginia, and Kentucky).
One-hundred and fifty-three grievances were taken to mediation during
the experimental period. Of those, 135 were finally resolved without resort to
arbitration-a final resolution rate of 89 percent. Slightly more than half (52
percent) of the mediation conferences resulted in a compromise settlement. In
22 percent, there was a noncompromise settlement (union withdrew in 15 percent, company granted in 7 percent). Advisory opinions were issued in 20
percent.
About half of the advisory opinions were accepted, and another half went
to arbitration. Of the twelve cases that went to arbitration after the mediator
had given a prediction as to the probable outcome at arbitration, nine were
decided as the mediator had predicted.
The issues involved in mediated grievances covered the contractual spectrum, with one significant exception-no grievances involving the discharge of
an employee were mediated. This was because union representatives believed
that the union could not, for internal political reasons, accept any resolution,
short of an arbitrator's decison, that left the grieving employee without a job.
The final resolution rate did not vary substantially by the nature of the
issue presented. From 75 to 100 percent of all grievances, regardless of the
issue, were resolved without recourse to arbitration. Here, too, there was but
one exception. Of those grievances in which the issue involved layoff, recall or
realignment of the work force, only 38 percent (%) were finally resolved at
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mediation. To some extent, this figure is deceptive, as three of the five grievances that were not resolved grew out of a single incident and presented a
common issue. Nevertheless, it is possible that because layoff and recall grievances, like discharge grievances, present the question of whether or not the
grieving employee is to have a job, they may be difficult to settle in mediation.
The time and cost savings of mediation over arbitration were great. The
average grievance was resolved in fifteen days from the date on which mediation was requested, which was three months faster than resolution through arbitration. The cost of mediation averaged $295 per grievance, less than onethird of the cost of arbitration. The total financial savings to the parties during
the twelve-month experimental period were approximately $100,000.
There was no over-all drop in the internal settlement rate with the advent
of mediation. One state did show approximately a 10 percent drop, which may
or may not have been causally related to the availability of mediation. Because,
however, those grievances that were not internally settled went to mediation,
rather than arbitration, and because mediation is substantially less expensive
than arbitration, in that state, too, the parties spent less money on dispute
resolution than they had prior to the availability of mediation.
User satisfaction with mediation was tested among five groups-company
labor relations representatives, union representatives, company operating personnel, local union officers, and grievants. A substantial majority of all groups
was satisfied with all aspects of the mediation procedure. When asked which
procedure they preferred-mediation or arbitration-all groups preferred mediation, particularly at the local level, where company operating personnel preferred mediation 6 to I and union officers did so 7 to 1.
While both the time and cost advantages of mediation were referred to by
the participants as a partial explanation for their preferring mediation to arbitration, the primary reason they gave was that they preferred the informal,
problem-solving approach of mediation to the more formal, contract-centered
approach of arbitration. A few excerpts from the interviews will convey the
flavor of the responses better than I can:
I like the informality. It creates an atmosphere of people trying to solve
problems through talk, rather than being enemies in a legal process. This is a
much better way to approach these problems. (District 12-Company)
There was a better feeling on both sides after everything was done. In
arbitration, there is usually one side that is very unhappy. Also it is more open
which leads to a better understanding of what the problem is about. (District
28-Company)
The big thing is that each party lays the case out on the table, which you
can't do at arbitration. I think it leads to cooperation, unlike the dog-eat-dog
atmosphere of arbitration. I think mediation can lead to a decision both sides
can live with, unlike the situation that often results in arbitration. (District
28-Union)
Another aspect of mediation that was frequently commented upon favorably by both union and company personnel was that it encouraged the parties

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[VQ1. 85

to resolve their own problems, rather than giving their problems to an arbitrator for decision. For example:
I like the fact we sat down and talked it over and got more facts out and
explained the problem to the mediator. I think it is better if the parties can
work out an answer than having the arbitrator take it home with him to make
a decision. (District 28-Company)
I like both sides presenting a case, then getting some input from a neutral
before a final decision is rendered. I like both parties making a decision to
solve a problem rather than an outsider. (District 28-Union)
One would hope that the problem-solving approach of mediation, which is
clearly liked by the miners, would diminish their tendency to resort to wildcat
strikes. Unfortunately, we do not yet have enough experience to know if it
does. The wildcat strike rate is down throughout the industry, undoubtedly
due in part to the depressed state of the economy, and only time will tell if
mediation can be successful in helping to keep it down. So, too, it is too soon to
tell if the parties' experience in problem-solving at mediation will lead to an
improvement in their day-to-day dispute resolution procedures.
In conclusion, I do not want to oversell the advantages of mediation. Our
experience is limited (though we have now mediated over 300 grievances with
essentially the same results), the participants thus far have been volunteers,
and we may all have been motivated by a missionary zeal that will not withstand the test of time. Still, our experience does suggest that, as long as arbitration remains available for those grievances that cannot be settled, mediation
has the potential to serve as a major step towards labor peace in the bituminous coal industry.
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